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The polygenomic organism
John Dupré
Introduction: genomes and organisms
Criticisms of the excessive attention on the powers of genes, ‘genocentrism’, 
have been common for many years1. While genes, genomes, or more generally 
DNA are certainly seen as playing a fundamental and even unique role in the 
functioning of living things, it is increasingly understood that this role can only 
be properly appreciated when adequate attention is also paid to substances or 
structures in interaction with which, and only in interaction with which, DNA 
can exhibit its remarkable powers. Criticisms of genocentrism are sometimes 
understood as addressing the idea that the genome should be seen as the essence 
of an organism, the thing or feature that makes that organism what it is. But 
despite the general decline not only of this idea, but of essentialism in general,2 
the assumptions that there is a special relation between an organism and its 
distinctive genome, and that this is a one-to-one relation, remain largely 
intact.
The general idea just described might be understood as relating either to 
types of organisms or to individual organisms. The genome is related to types 
of organism by attempts to find within it the essence of a species or other bio-
logical kind. This is a natural, if perhaps naïve, interpretation of the idea of the 
species ‘barcode’, the use of particular bits of DNA sequence to define or iden-
tify species membership. But in this paper I am interested rather in the relation 
sometimes thought to hold between genomes of a certain type and an individual 
organism. This need not be an explicitly essentialist thesis, merely the simple 
factual belief that the cells that make up an organism all, as a matter of fact, 
have in common the inclusion of a genome, and the genomes in these cells are, 
barring the odd collision with a cosmic ray or other unusual accident, identical. 
It might as well be said right away that the organisms motivating this thesis are 
large multicellular organisms, and perhaps even primarily animals. I shall not 
be concerned, for instance, with the fungi that form networks of hyphae con-
necting the roots of plants, and are hosts to multiple distinct genomes appar-
ently capable of moving around this network (Sanders, 2002). I should perhaps 
apologise for this narrow focus. Elsewhere I have criticized philosophers of 
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biology and others for a myopic focus on a quite unusual type of organism, the 
multicellular animal (O’Malley and Dupré, 2007). Nonetheless it is unsurprising 
that we should have a particular interest in the class of organisms to which we 
ourselves belong, and this is undoubtedly an interesting kind of organism. And 
in the end, if my argument is successful for multicellular animals it will apply 
all the more easily to other, less familiar, forms of life.
At any rate, it is an increasingly familiar idea that we, say, have such a char-
acteristic genome in each cell of our body, and that this genome is something 
unique and distinctive to each of us. It is even more familiar that there is some-
thing, ‘the human genome’, which is common to all of us, although, in light of 
the first point, it will be clear that this is not exactly the same from one person 
to another. The first point is perhaps most familiar in the context of forensic 
genomics, in the realization that the tiniest piece of corporeal material that any 
of us leaves lying around can be unequivocally traced back to us as its certain 
source. At any rate, what I aim to demonstrate in this paper is that this assump-
tion of individual genetic homogeneity is highly misleading, and indeed is symp-
tomatic of a cluster of misunderstandings about the nature of the biological 
systems we denominate as organisms.
Organisms and clones
A clone, outside Star Wars style science fiction, is a group of cells originating 
from a particular ancestral cell through a series of cell divisions. The reason we 
suppose the cells in a human body to share the same genome is that we think 
of the human body as, in this sense, a clone: it consists of a very large group of 
cells derived by cell divisions from an originating zygote. A familiar complica-
tion is that if I have a monozygotic (‘identical’) twin, then my twin will be part 
of the same clone as myself. Although this is only an occasional problem for 
the human case, in other parts of biology it can be much more significant. Lots 
of organisms reproduce asexually and the very expression ‘asexual reproduc-
tion’ is close to an oxymoron if we associate biological individuals with clones. 
For asexual reproduction is basically no more than cell division, and cell divi-
sion is the growth of a clone. If reproduction is the production of a new indi-
vidual it cannot also be the growth of a pre-existing individual. Indeed what 
justifies taking the formation of a zygote as the initiation of a new organism, 
reproduction rather than growth, is that it is the beginning of a clone of distinc-
tive cells with a novel genome formed through the well-known mixture between 
parts of the paternal and the maternal genomes.
As I have noted, it is common to think of genomes as standing in one-to-one 
relations with organisms. My genome, for instance, is almost surely unique and 
it, or something very close to it, can be found in every cell in my body. Or so, 
anyhow, the standard story goes. The existence of clones that do not conform 
to the simple standard story provides an immediate and familiar complication 
for the uniqueness part of this relation. If I had a monozygotic (‘identical’) twin, 
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then there would be two organisms whose cells contained (almost) exactly 
the same genomes; we would both, since originating from the same lineage-
founding zygote, be parts of the same clone. And lots of organisms reproduce 
asexually all or some of the time, so this difficulty is far from esoteric.
Some biologists, especially botanists, have bitten the bullet here. They dis-
tinguish ramets and genets, where the genet is the sum total of all the organisms 
in a clone, whereas the ramet is the more familiar individual (Harper, 1977). 
Thus a grove of trees propagated by root suckers, such as are commonly 
formed, for instance, by the quaking aspen (Populus tremuloides), in the deserts 
of the South West United States, is one genet but a large number of ramets. 
Along similar lines it has famously been suggested that among the largest organ-
isms are fungi of the genus Armillaria, the familiar honey fungi (Smith et al., 
1992). A famous example is an individual of the species Armillaria ostoyae in 
the Malheur National Forest in Oregon that was found to cover 8.9 km2 (2,200 
acres).3 To the average mushroom collector a single mushroom is an organism, 
and it would be strange indeed to claim that two mushrooms collected miles 
apart were parts of the same organism. There is nothing wrong with the idea 
that for important theoretical purposes this counterintuitive conception may be 
the right one; there is also nothing wrong with the more familiar concept of a 
mushroom. The simple but important moral is just that we should be pluralistic 
about how we divide the biological world into individuals: different purposes 
may dictate different ways of carving things up.
It’s pretty clear, however, that we cannot generally admit that parts of a clone 
are parts of the same individual. Whether or not there are technical contexts 
for which it is appropriate, I doubt whether there are many interesting purposes 
for which two monozygotic human twins should be counted as two halves of 
one organism. Or anyhow, there are certainly interesting purposes for which 
they must be counted as distinct organisms, including almost all the regular 
interests of human life. An obvious reason for this is that most of the career of 
my monozygotic twin (if I had one) would be quite distinct from my own. And 
for reasons some of which should become clearer in light of the discussion below 
of epigenetics, the characteristics of monozygotic twins tend to diverge increas-
ingly as time passes. The careers of monozygotic twins may carry on indepen-
dently from birth in complete ignorance of one another; but it is hardly plausible 
that if I were now to discover that I had a monozygotic twin, this would drasti-
cally change my sense of who I was (ie a spatially discontinuous rather than 
spatially connected entity). Some kind of continuing connection seems needed 
even to make sense of the idea that these could be parts of the same thing. Being 
parts of the same clone is at any rate not a sufficient condition for being parts 
of the same biological individual.
However, we should not immediately assume that the concept of a genet 
encompassing a large number of ramets is generally indefensible. A better con-
clusion to draw is that theoretical considerations are insufficient to determine 
unequivocally the boundaries of biological objects. Sometimes, perhaps always, 
this must be done relative to a purpose. There are many purposes for which we 
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distinguish human individuals and for the great majority of which it would 
make no sense to consider my twin and myself part of the same entity. My twin 
will not be liable to pay my debts or care for my children, for instance, if I 
should default on these responsibilities, though it is interesting in the latter case 
that standard techniques for determining that they are my children would not 
distinguish my paternity from my twin’s. This may even point to an evolution-
ary perspective from which we are best treated as a single individual. And when 
it comes to the trees, this is surely the right way to go. For the purposes of some 
kinds of evolutionary theory the single genet may be the right individual to 
distinguish, but if one is interested in woodland ecology, what matters will be 
the number of ramets. If this seems an implausible move, this is presumably 
because of the seemingly self-evident individuality of many biological entities. 
I hope that some of the considerations that follow will help to make this indi-
viduality a lot less self-evident than it might appear at first sight. But whether 
or not the pluralism I have suggested for individual boundaries is defensible, 
the assumption of a one-to-one relation between genomes and organisms is not. 
I will explain the objections to this assumption in what I take to be an order of 
increasing fundamentality. At any rate, as the next section will demonstrate, the 
various phenomena of genetic mosaicism suffice to demonstrate that genotypes 
will not serve to demarcate the boundaries of biological individuals. Or in other 
words, genomic identity is not a necessary condition for being part of the same 
biological individual.
Genomic chimeras and mosaics
The general rubric of genomic mosaicism encompasses a cluster of phenomena. 
An extreme example, sometimes distinguished more technically as chimerism, 
is of organisms that have resulted form the fusion of two zygotes, or fertilised 
eggs, in utero. The consequence of this is that different parts of the organism 
will have different genomes – the organism is a mosaic of cells of the two dif-
ferent genomic types from which it originated. A tragic consequence of this has 
been the occasional cases of women who have been denied custody of their 
children on the basis of genetic tests that appeared to show that they and the 
child were not related. It has turned out that the explanation of this apparent 
contradiction of a connection of which the mother was in no doubt was that 
she was a genomic mosaic of this kind, and the cells tested to establish the 
parental relation were from a different origin from the gametes that gave rise 
to the child (Yu et al., 2002). With the exception of a modest degree of chime-
rism found in some fraternal twins who have exchanged blood and blood cell 
precursors in utero and continue to have distinct genotypes in adult blood cells, 
such cases are generally assumed to be very rare in humans. However, chimeras 
do not necessarily experience any unusual symptoms, so the prevalence of full 
chimerism, chimerism derived from multiple zygotes, is not really known, and 
may be much higher than suspected.
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Probably more common than chimerisms resulting from the fusion of two 
zygotes are those resulting from mutations at some early stage of cell division. 
One well-known example of this is XY Turner syndrome, in which the individ-
ual is a mixture of cells with the normal XY karyotype, the complement of sex 
chromosomes found in most males, and XO cells, in which there is no Y chro-
mosome and only one X chromosome (Edwards, 1971). Turner syndrome is a 
condition of girls in which all the cells are XO (ie with one X chromosome 
missing, as opposed to the standard XX); people with XY Turner syndrome 
generally have normal male phenotypes, though a small percentage are female 
and a similar small percentage are intersexed. The large majority of fetuses with 
either condition are spontaneously aborted. The phenotype displayed by XY 
Turner cases is presumably dependent on exactly when in development the loss 
of the X chromosome occurs.
Chimerism is quite common in some other organisms. When cows have twins 
there is usually some degree of shared fetal circulation, and both twins become 
partially chimeric. This has been familiar from antiquity in the phenomenon of 
freemartinism, freemartins being the sterile female cattle that have been known 
since the 18th century invariably to have a male twin. This is the normal 
outcome for mixed sex bovine twins, with the female twin being masculinised 
by hormones deriving from the male twin.4 This has occasionally been observed 
in other domesticated animals. Even more than for the human case, the preva-
lence of this, and other forms of chimerism, in nature is not known.
The chimeras mentioned so far are all naturally occurring phenomena. Much 
more attention has lately been attracted by the possibility of artificially produc-
ing chimeras in the laboratory. And unsurprisingly, the most attention had been 
focused on the possibility of producing chimeras, or hybrids, that are in part 
human. Recent controversy has focused on the ethical acceptability of generat-
ing hybrid embryos for research purposes by transplanting a human nucleus 
into the egg cell of an animal of another species, usually a cow.5 Since all the 
nuclear DNA in such a hybrid is human, it can be argued that this is not a 
chimera at all, at least in the genetic sense under consideration. On the other 
hand such cells will contain non-human DNA in the mitochondria, the extra-
nuclear structures in the cell that provide the energy for cellular processes.6 No 
doubt the mixture of living material from humans and non-humans is disturbing 
to many whether or not the material in question is genetic, as is clear from 
controversy over the possibility of xenotransplantation, use of other animals to 
provide replacement organisms. But this will not be my concern in the present 
paper (though see Parry and Twine’s papers in this volume).
Modern laboratories, at any rate, are well able to produce chimeric organ-
isms. At the more exotic end of such products, and certainly chimeras, are such 
things as ‘geeps’, produced by fusing a sheep embryo with a goat embryo. The 
adults that develop from these fused embryos are visibly and bizarrely chimeric, 
having sheep wool on parts of their bodies and goat hair on others. Much more 
significant, however, are the transgenic organisms that have caused widespread 
public discomfort in the context of genetically modified (GM) foods (see Milne, 
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this volume). These are often seen as some kind of violation of the natural order, 
the mixing together of things that Nature or God intended to keep apart (see 
Barnes and Dupré, 2008). Whatever other objections there may be to the pro-
duction of GM organisms, it will become increasingly clear that this is not one 
with which I am sympathetic: organisms do not naturally display the genetic 
purity that this concern seems to assume.
The chimeric organisms discussed so far in this section have been organisms 
originating to some degree from two distinct zygotes. (The exception is the XY 
Turner syndrome, which should strictly have been considered in the context of 
the following discussion.) Other cases relevant to the general topic of intraor-
ganismic genomic diversity, but generally referred to by the term mosaicism 
rather than chimerism, exhibit genomic diversity but deriving from a single 
zygotic origin. Such mosaicism is undoubtedly very common. One extremely 
widespread instance is the mosaicism common to most or all female mammals 
that results from the expression of different X chromosomes in different somatic 
cells. In the human female, one of the X chromosomes is condensed into a cel-
lular object referred to as the Barr body and is largely inert. Different parts of 
the body may have different X chromosomes inactive, implying that they have 
different active genotypes. This phenomenon will apply to most sexually repro-
ducing organisms, though in some groups of organisms, for example birds, it is 
the male rather than the female that is liable to exhibit this kind of mosaicism.7 
The most familiar phenotypic consequence of this phenomenon is that exhibited 
by tortoiseshell or calico cats, in which the different coat colours reflect the 
inactivation of different X chromosomes. Although there are very rare cases of 
male calico cats, these appear to be the result of chromosomal anomaly (XXY 
karyotype), chimerism, or mosaicism in which the XXY karyotype appears as 
a mutation during development (Centerwall and Benirschke, 1973).
Returning to chimerism, mosaicism deriving from distinct zygotes, a quite 
different but very widespread variety is exhibited by females, including women, 
after they have borne children, and is the result of a small degree of genomic 
intermixing of the maternal and offspring genomes. Though scientists have been 
aware of this phenomenon for several decades it has recently been the focus of 
increased attention for several reasons. For example, recent work suggests that 
the transfer of maternal cells to the fetus may be important in training the lat-
ter’s immune system (Mold et al., 2008). Another reason for increasing interest 
in this topic is the fact that it opens up the possibility of genetic testing of the 
fetus using only maternal blood, and thus avoiding the risks inherent in invasive 
techniques for fetal testing such as amniocentesis (Lo, 2000; Benn and Chapman, 
2009). It should also be noted that maternal cells appear to persist in the off-
spring and vice versa long after birth, suggesting that we are all to some degree 
genomic mosaics incorporating elements from our mothers and, for women, our 
offspring.
One final cause of chimerism that must be mentioned is the artificial kind 
created by transplant medicine, including blood transfusions. Very likely this 
will continue to become more common as techniques of transplantation become 
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more refined and successful. A possibility increasingly under discussion is that 
this will eventually be extended, through the development of xenotransplanta-
tion, to include interspecific mosaicism. At any rate, any kind of transplanta-
tion, except that involving cells produced by the recipient himself or herself, will 
produce some genomic chimerism. So, in summary, both natural and artificial 
processes, but most commonly the former, generate significant degrees of chi-
merism in many, perhaps almost all, multicellular organisms including our-
selves. The assumption that all the cells in a multicellular organism share the 
same genome is therefore seriously simplistic and, as mentioned above, conclu-
sions drawn from this simplistic assumption, for example about the violation 
of Nature involved in producing artificial chimeras are, to the extent that they 
rely on this assumption, ungrounded.
Epigenetics
The topics of chimerism and mosaicism so far discussed address the extent to 
which the cells that make up a body are genomically uniform in the sense of 
containing the same DNA sequences. This discussion runs a risk of seeming to 
take for granted the widely held view that, given a certain common genome, 
understood as a genome with a particular sequence of nucleotides (the As Cs 
Gs and Ts familiar to everyone in representations of DNA sequence), the behav-
iour of other levels of biological organisation will be determined. Perhaps a 
more fundamental objection to the one genome one organism doctrine is that 
this common assumption is entirely misguided. The reason that the previous 
discussion may reinforce such an erroneous notion is that the comparisons and 
contrasts between genomes were implicitly assumed to be based entirely on 
sequence comparisons. But to know what influence a genome will actually have 
in a particular cellular context one requires a much more detailed and nuanced 
description of the genome than can be given merely by sequence. And once we 
move to that more sophisticated level of description it becomes clear that, even 
within the sequence-homogeneous cell lineages often thought to constitute a 
multicellular organism, there is a great deal of genomic diversity. These more 
sophisticated descriptions are sought within the burgeoning scientific field of 
epigenetics, or epigenomics.
A good way of approaching the subject matter of epigenetics is to reflect on 
the question why, if indeed all our cells do have the same genome, they never-
theless do a variety of very different things. It is of course very familiar that not 
all the cells in a complex organism do the same things – they are differentiated 
into skin cells, liver cells, nerve cells, and so on. Part of the explanation for this 
is that the genome itself is modified during development, a process studied under 
the rubric of epigenetics or epigenomics.8 The best-known such modification is 
methylation, in which a cytosine molecule in the DNA sequence is converted to 
5-methyl-cytosine, a small chemical addition to one of the nucleotides, or bases, 
that makeup the DNA molecule. This has the effect of blocking transcription 
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of the DNA sequence at particular sites in the genome. Other epigenetic modi-
fications affect the protein core, or histones, which form part of the structure 
of the chromosome, and also influence whether particular lengths of DNA are 
transcribed into RNA. It is sometimes supposed that these are not ‘real’, or 
anyhow significant, alterations of the genome, perhaps because we still describe 
the genome sequence in the same way, referring to either cytosine or 5-methyl-
cytosine by the letter C. But all this really shows is that the standard four letter 
representation of genomic sequence is an abstraction. As a matter of fact there 
are about 20 nucleotides that can occur in DNA sequences, and it is only our 
choice of representation that maintains the illusion that some chemically fixed 
entity, the genome, can be found in all our cells. If we were to change the rep-
resentation to a more fine-grained description of chemical composition, we 
would find a much greater genomic diversity than is disclosed by the more 
abstract and familiar four letter code.
It is true that part of the value of the abstraction that treats the genome as 
consisting of only four nucleotides is that this does represent a very stable 
underlying structure. This has provided extremely useful applications that use 
stable genome sequence to compare or identify organisms, applications ranging 
from phylogenetic analysis to forensic DNA fingerprinting. Phylogenetic analy-
sis, the investigation of evolutionary relations between kinds of organisms, here 
depends on the stability of genomes as they are transmitted down the genera-
tions, and DNA fingerprinting depends on the admittedly much shorter term 
stability of genome sequence within the life of the individual. Methylation, on 
the other hand, is reversible and often reversed. However over-emphasis on this 
stable core can be one of the most fundamental sources of misunderstanding in 
theoretical biology.
Such misunderstanding is sometimes expressed in the so-called Central 
Dogma of Molecular Biology.9 This is generally interpreted as stating that 
information flows from DNA to RNA to proteins, but never in the reverse 
direction. I don’t wish to get involved in exegesis of what important truth may 
be alluded to with this slogan, and still less into the vexed interpretation of the 
biological meaning of ‘information’ (Maynard Smith, 2000; Griffiths, 2001). 
What is no longer disputable is that causal interaction goes both in the preferred 
direction of the Central Dogma, and in the reverse direction. Epigenetic changes 
to the genome are induced by chemical interactions with the surrounding cell 
(typically with RNA and protein molecules). A reason why this is so important 
is that it points to a mechanism whereby even very distant events can eventually 
have an impact on the genome and its functioning. The classic demonstration 
of this is the work of Michael Meaney and colleagues, on ways in which mater-
nal care can modify the development of cognitive abilities in baby rats, some-
thing which has been shown to be mediated by methylation of genomes in brain 
cells (Champagne and Meaney, 2006). The most recent work by this group has 
provided compelling reason to extrapolate these results to humans (McGowan 
et al., 2009). Whether epigenetic research shows that genomes are diverse 
throughout the animal body of course depends on one’s definition of ‘genome’ 
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and one’s criterion for counting two as the same. It needs just to be noted that 
if we choose a definition that, pace the points made in earlier sections, counts 
every cell as having the same genome, we will be overlooking differences that 
make a great difference to what the cell actually does.
Symbiosis and metaorganisms
In this section I want to make a more radical suggestion. So far I have consid-
ered the diversity of human (or other animal) cells that may be found in an 
individual organism; and the phenomena I have described are generally familiar 
ones to molecular biologists. In this section I shall propose that there are good 
reasons to deny the almost universal assumption that all the cells in an individ-
ual must belong to the same species. This may seem no more than tautological: 
if a species is a kind of organism then how can an organism incorporate parts 
or members of different species? The resolution of this paradox is to realise that 
very general terms in biology such as species or organism do not have univocal 
definitions: in different contexts these terms can be used in different ways. For 
the case of species, this is quite widely agreed among philosophers of biology 
today (see, eg Dupré, 2002, chs. 3, 4.) I am also inclined to argue something 
similar for organisms. Very roughly, I want to suggest that the organisms that 
are parts of evolutionary lineages are not the same things as the organisms that 
interact functionally with their biological and non-biological surroundings. The 
latter, which I take to be more fundamental, are composed of a variety of the 
former, which are the more traditionally conceived organisms. But before 
explaining this idea in more detail I need to say a bit more about the facts on 
which it is based. I shall introduce these with specific reference first to the 
human.
A functioning human organism is a symbiotic system containing a multitude 
of microbial cells – bacteria, archaea, and fungi – without which the whole 
would be seriously dysfunctional and ultimately non-viable. Most of these 
reside in the gut, but they are also found on the skin, and in all body cavities. 
In fact about 90 per cent of the cells that make up the human body belong to 
such microbial symbionts and, owing to their great diversity, they contribute 
something like 99 per cent of the genes in the human body. It was once common 
to think of these as little more than parasites, or at best opportunistic residents 
of the various vacant niches provided by the surfaces and cavities of the body. 
However it has become clear that, on the contrary, these symbionts are essential 
for the proper functioning of the human body. This has been recognized in a 
major project being led by the U.S. National Institutes of Helath, that aims to 
map the whole set of genes in a human, the Human Microbiome Project.10
The role of microbes in digestion is most familiar and is now even exploited 
by advertisers of yoghurt. But even more interesting are their roles in develop-
ment and in the immune system. In organisms in which it is possible to do the 
relevant experiments it has turned out that genes are activated in human cells 
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by symbiotic microbes, and vice versa (Rawls et al., 2004). Hence the genomes 
of the human cells and the symbiotic microbes are mutually dependent. And it 
seems plausible that the complex microbial communities that line the surfaces 
of the human organism are the first lines of defence in keeping out unwanted 
microbes.11 Since the immune system is often defined as the system that distin-
guishes self from non-self, this role makes it particularly difficult to characterize 
our symbiotic partners as entirely distinct from ourselves. Finally, it is worth 
recalling that we are not much tempted to think of the mitochondria that 
provide the basic power supply for all our cellular processes as distinct from 
ourselves. Yet these are generally agreed to be long captive bacteria that have 
lost the ability to survive outside the cell.
These phenomena are far from being unique to the human case, and arguably 
similar symbiotic arrangements apply to all multicellular animals. In the case 
of plants, the mediation of the metabolic relations between the plant roots and 
the surrounding soil is accomplished by extremely complex microbial systems 
involving consortia of bacteria as well as fungi whose webs pass in and out of 
the roots, and which are suspected of transferring nutrients between diverse 
members of the plant community, suggesting a much larger symbiotic system 
(Hart et al., 2003).
My colleague Maureen O’Malley and I (Dupré and O’Malley, 2009) have 
suggested that the most fundamental way to think of living things is as the 
intersection of lineages and metabolism. The point we are making is that, con-
trary to the idea that is fundamental to the one genome one organism idea, the 
biological entities that form reproducing and evolving lineages are not the same 
as the entities that function as wholes in wider biological contexts. Functional 
biological wholes, the entities that we primarily think of as organisms, are in 
fact cooperating assemblies of a wide variety of lineage-forming entities. In the 
human case, as well as what we more traditionally think of as human cell lin-
eages, these wider wholes include a great variety of external and internal sym-
bionts. An interesting corollary of this perspective is that although we do not 
wish to downplay the importance of competition in the evolution of complex 
systems, the role of cooperation in forming the competing wholes has been 
greatly underestimated. And there is a clear tendency in evolutionary history 
for entities that once competed to form larger aggregates that now cooperate.
Conclusion
It should be clear that there is a continuity between the phenomena I described 
under the heading of chimerism and mosaicism and those discussed in the pre-
ceding section. Living systems, I am arguing, are extremely diverse and oppor-
tunistic compilations of elements from many distinct sources. These include 
components drawn from what are normally considered members of the same 
species, as illustrated by many of the cases of chimerism, but also, and more 
fundamentally, by the collaborations between organisms of quite different 
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species, or lineages, which have been the topic of the preceding section. All of 
these cases contradict the common if seldom articulated assumption of one 
genome, one organism.
One plausible hypothesis about the attraction of the one genome one organ-
ism assumption is that it represents an answer to the question, what is the right 
way of dividing biological reality into organisms. But, as I have argued through-
out this essay, there is no unequivocal answer to this question. From the 
complex collaborations between the diverse elements in a cell, themselves 
forming in some cases (such as mitochondria) distinct lineages, through the 
intricate collaborations in multispecies microbial communities, to the even more 
complex cooperations that comprise multicellular organisms, biological entities 
consists of disparate elements working together. Different questions about, or 
interests in, this hierarchy of cooperative and competitive processes will require 
different distinctions and different boundaries defining individual entities. As 
with the more familiar question about species, in which it is quite widely agreed 
that different criteria of division will be needed to address different questions, 
so it is, I have argued with individuals. This is one of the more surprising con-
clusions that have emerged from the revolution in biological understanding that 
is gestured at by the rubric, genomics.
Returning finally to the distinctively human, the capacities that most clearly 
demarcate humans from other organisms – language, culture – are the capacities 
that derive from our increasing participation in ever more complex social 
wholes. A further extension of the argument sketched in the preceding para-
graph would see this as the next stage in the hierarchy of collaboration and 
perhaps, as has often been speculated, genuinely marking the human as a novel 
evolutionary innovation. Rather less speculatively, it is arguably a striking irony 
that the often remarked centrality of individualism in the last 200 years of social 
theory has perhaps been the greatest obstacle to seeing the profoundly social, 
or anyhow cooperative, nature of life more generally.
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Notes
 1 For a recent example, see Barnes and Dupré 2008.
 2 At any rate among philosophers concerned with the details of scientific belief. Essentialism has 
had something of a resurgence among more abstractly inclined metaphysicians (Ellis, 2001; 
Devitt, 2008).
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 3 See http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=strange-but-true-largest-organism-is-
fungus (Accessed 2 Nov 2000).
 4 Exactly to what extent this is the normal outcome remains as with so many phenomena in this 
area somewhat unclear, however (Zhang et al., 1994).
 5 Although research involving hybrid embryos is generally thought unacceptable unless there are 
clear potential medical benefits, opinion in the UK is quite finely divided on this topic (Jones, 
2009).
 6 As a matter of fact the mitochondria are now known to be descendants of bacteria that long 
ago became symbiotically linked to the cells of all eukaryotes, or ‘higher’ organisms. This may 
suggest a further sense in which we are all chimeric, a suggestion I shall elaborate shortly.
 7 Curiously, however, it appears that birds find less need to compensate for the overexpression 
of genes on the chromosome of which one sex has two (in birds the male has two Z chromo-
somes). So this kind of mosaicism will be less common, or may not occur at all (Marshall Graves 
and Disteche, 2007).
 8 It appears that the phenomenon in question may not be fully explicable at all, however, as gene 
expression is also importantly affected by random processes, or noise (Raser and O’Shea, 2005). 
But there is also growing evidence that noise of this kind may be adaptive, and hence this effect 
may have been subject to natural selection (Maamar et al., 2007).
 9 This phrase was introduced originally by Francis Crick, and I have no wish to accuse Crick 
himself of misunderstanding. Indeed the use of the word ‘dogma’ suggests a degree of irony.
10 See http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/hmp/. (Accessed 28 Oct 2009).
11 More traditional views of the limits of the human organism might make it seem strange that a 
strong correlate of infection with the hospital superbug, Clostridium difficileis exposure to pow-
erful courses of antibiotics, though this correlation is not quite as pervasive as was earlier 
thought (Dial et al., 2008).
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